For Bailey, the U.N. report at least cleared up one mystery he'd pondered since the beginning of the investigation: why Le Roux was placing calls to Somalia from his Philippine cellphone.

Back in the Florida investigation, Brill and Bailey felt like they were closing in on Le Roux's shrinking pharmacy operation. That August, they obtained a T3 wiretap on Omer Bezalel. In one con- versation between Bezalel and the man they now knew to be Lach- lan McConnell, they could hear that McConnell sounded anxious, distressed over the disappearance of Dave Smith and uneasy about the risks of his new tasks in Florida. "He was kind of going through this mental breakdown," Brill said. "I think he was struggling with a lot of things that he was doing." Bezalel suggested McConnell take a vacation. Bailey decided it was time to bring McConnell in and try to flip him. Finally, they might have the insider they'd been seeking for years, someone who could take the stand in court and point the finger at Le Roux.

But then they overheard something else on the wiretap: McCon- nell was leaving that same day for Manila, stopping in Los Ange- les.

Bailey called the prosecutor, Linda Marks, to discuss whether they should risk intercepting him. Bailey could fly to L.A. and pull him off the plane, warning him that if he didn't talk now, he'd be brought down along with the rest of the organization. But Bailey would be bluffing. While they were 90 percent sure McConnell would turn on Le Roux, they didn't have much evidence of McConnell's own illegal acts to use as leverage. If they were wrong about him, he could alert Le Roux and send him into hiding. "He could call our bluff," Bailey said. "Those are the calculated risks that you take in these cat-and-mouse games." They decided to wait to see if he re- turned to the United States and wiretap him if he did.

When he showed up in Florida again the next month, they rushed to file for a T3 warrant on McConnell's cellphone. "Kim